Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1997

Boyd J. Brown and Interwest Aviation Corporation
v. David K. Richards & Company and David K.
Richards : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Bruce E. Coke; John W. Call; Curtis C. Nesset; Nygaard, Coke & Vincent; Attorneys for Plaintiffs,
Appellees, and Cross-Appellants.
Robert S. Campbell, Jr.; Bridget K. Romano; Campbell Maack & Sessions; Elizabeth T. Dunning;
Carolyn Cox; Watkiss Dunning & Watkiss; Attorneys for Defendants, Appellants, and CrossAppellees.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Brown v. Richards, No. 970536 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1057

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BOYD J. BROWN, an individual,
and INTERWEST AVIATION
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation
Plaintiffs, Appellees, and
Cross-Appellants,
vs.

DAVID K. RICHARDS &
COMPANY and DAVID K.
RICHARDS, an individual,

«# i Mrt COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
.A10
DOCKET NO.
^OSM,

Case No. 970536-CA
Priority No. 15

Defendants, Appellants,
and Cross-Appellees.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
Appeal From a Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, in
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge, presiding by the Honorable Stephen L.
Henriod, Judge.

ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557)
BRIDGET K. ROMANO (6979)
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
201 South Main Street, 13th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
ELIZABETH T. DUNNING (3896)
CAROLYN COX (4816)
WATKISS DUNNING & WATKISS, P.C.
I l l East Broadway, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2304
Attorneys for Defendants. Appellants
and Cross-Appellees

BRUCE E. COKE (0694)
JOHN W. CALL (0542)
CURTIS C. NESSET (4238)
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Attorneys for Plaintiffs. Appellees,
and Cross-Appellants

A 2 1998
the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BOYD J. BROWN, an individual,
and INTERWEST AVIATION
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation
Plaintiffs, Appellees, and
Cross-Appellants,
vs.
DAVID K. RICHARDS &
COMPANY and DAVID K.
RICHARDS, an individual,

Case No. 970536-CA
Priority No. 15

Defendants, Appellants,
and Cross-Appellees.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
Appeal From a Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, in
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge, presiding by the Honorable Stephen L.
Henriod, Judge.

ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557)
BRIDGET K. ROMANO (6979)
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
201 South Main Street, 13th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
ELIZABETH T. DUNNING (3896)
CAROLYN COX (4816)
WATKISS D U N N I N G & WATKISS, P.C.
I l l East Broadway, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2304
Attorneys for Defendants, Appellants
and Cross-Appellees

BRUCE E. COKE (0694)
JOHN W. CALL (0542)
CURTIS C. NESSET (4238)
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Attorneys for Plaintiffs. Appellees,
and Cross-Appellants

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

1

ARGUMENT

1

POINT I

1

RICHARDS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED ANY
ATTORNEY FEES BECAUSE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING
HIS FEE APPLICATION DID N O T MEET THE
REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY THIS COURT.
A.

Richards did not allocate attorney fees as directed by this Court.

3

B.

Richards is no t entitled to fees o ther than those incurred for the
breach of warranty claim, but only if proof of those fees
satisfied this Court's requirements

7

C.

Richards misconstrues Browns claim of error by the trial court.

10

D.

Richards' position is not supported by the case lam

13

POINT II

15

RICHARDS
SHOULD
NOT
HAVE
RECEIVED
ATTORNEY FEES FOR CALCULATING HIS ATTORNEY
FEES.
POINT III

18

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD N O T HAVE AWARDED
PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST TO RICHARDS ON
ATTORNEY FEES.
POINT IV

20

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT
DETERMINED THAT POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST
CARRIES THE INTEREST RATE OF THE OLD STATUTE
RATHER THAN THE NEW STATUTE.
l

22

POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AWARDING PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ON THE BREACH OF
WARRANTY DAMAGES.
POINT VI

23

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE OFFSET THE
JUDGMENT SO THAT ONLY ONE NET JUDGMENT
RESULTED.
CONCLUSION

24

u

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED

Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kureet. 876 P.2d 421 (Utah App. 1994)

19, 20

Baldwin v. Burton. 850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993)

11

Bellon v. Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991)

22

Brown v. Richards. 840 P.2d 143 (Utah App. 1992)
Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine. 830 P.2d 266 (Utah 1992)
Foote v. Clark. 962 P.2d 52 (Utah 1998)

1, 11, 19
2, 11, 12, 13
13, 14

Graco Fishing & Rental Tools. Inc. v. Ironwood Exploration. Inc..

11

766 P.2d 1074 (Utah 1988)
Groen v. Tri-O-Inc. 667 P.2d 598 (Utah 1983)
Hansen v. Kohler. 550 P.2d 186 (Utah 1976)
James Constructors. Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 888 P.2d 665

9
24
15, 17

(Utah App. 1994)
Kaiser Aluminum v. Bonjorno. 494 US 827 (1990)
Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245 n. 11 (Utah 1988)
Mason v. Western Mortgage Loan Corp.. 754 P.2d 984

20, 21
21
18, 19

(Utah App. 1988)
Miller v. TransFlorida Bank. 656 So.2d 1364 (Fla. Dist. App. 1995)
Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre Inv. Co.. 956 P.2d 257 (Utah 1998)
Paul MueUer Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n.. 657 P.2d 1279 (Utah 1982)
Redevelopment Agency v. Daskalas. 785 P.2d 1112 (Utah App. 1989)

iii

19, 20
21
11
10, 11

Salmon v. Davis County. 916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996)

15, 16, 17

Selvage v. J. J. Johnson & Assocs.. 910 P.2d 1252 (Utah App. 1996)

12, 13

Stockton Theatres. Inc. v. Palermo. 360 P.2d 76 (Cal. 1961)

18, 19

Stubbs v. Hemmert. 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 1977)

18

Trayner v. Gushing. 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984)

18

Turde Management. Inc. v. Haggis Management. Inc.. 645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982)
Visitor Info. Ctr. v. Tax Comm'n.. 930 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1997)

. . . 14
21

STATUTES AND RULES

28 USC §1961

20

Utah Code Ann. §15-1-4

21

Utah Code Ann §15-1-4(2)

21

Utah Code Ann. §68-3-3

21

IV

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLEES/CROSS-APPEUANTS
INTRODUCTION
This case involves issues on the appeal and cross-appeal which are closely related.
Specifically, Richards claimed that the trial court erroneously awarded him insufficient
attorney fees and that he is entitled to more. On the cross-appeal, Brown asserted, in part,
that the trial court should not have awarded Richards any attorney fees because he failed to
present sufficient evidence of fees on remand as required by this Court.

In his

reply/response brief, Richards addresses both issues under the guise of a "reply." In this
brief, Brown will follow the format of Points I through VI of his opening brief on the crossappeal rather than attempting to parallel Richards1 unusual format.1,2
ARGUMENT
POINT I
RICHARDS SHOULD N O T HAVE BEEN AWARDED ANY
ATTORNEY FEES BECAUSE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING
HIS FEE APPLICATION DID N O T MEET THE
REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY THIS COURT.
In the initial opinion in this case the court reversed the trial court on the issue of
Richards' attorney fees.3 Brown v. Richards. 840 P.2d 143, 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The
court held that the trial court's findings on the issue of Richards' attorney fees were

j

Richards does not respond to Point VII of Brown's opening brief on the cross-appeal.
There Brown maintained that he is entitled to attorney fees on this appeal should this Court
either sustain the trial court's reduced fee award to Richards or determine that Richards is
entided to no fees. Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 33. By not responding to this
issue, Richards apparendy concedes its validity.
^ h i s brief will make references to Richards' reply/response brief where possible.
3

Brown's attorney fees were not appealed.

inadequate to support the award. The court of appeals' opinion dictated Richards' burden
on remand:
On remand, Richards
must set out the time and fees expended for (1) successful claims for
which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful
claims for which there would have been an entitlement to attorney fees
had this claim been successful, and (3) claims for which there is no
entitlement to attorney fees.
Cottonwood Mall. 830 P.2d at 269-70. The trial court's finding should then
mirror the foregoing categories so that they may be reviewable.
Brown, 840 P.2d at 156 n.12.4 As the court of appeals noted, these criteria were taken from
the Utah Supreme Court case Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine. 830 P.2d 266, 269-270 (Utah
1992). Because Richards failed to make the allocations required by this Court, the trial court
erred because its findings do not "mirror the foregoing categories" and thus, the award of
any specific amount was erroneous.
At the outset of this argument, Brown wishes to emphasi2e two critical points. First,
Brown is not claiming that Richards is not entitled to attorney fees under the contract. In
fact, Brown admits that Richards is entitled to attorney fees under the contract for the breach
of warranty claim. This claim, but only this claim, falls within the category "successful claims

4

Richards claims that Brown "never submitted any affirmative evidence which
challenged Richards' fee allocation." Richards' Reply/Response Brief at 1. This claim is
wrong for two reasons. First, the court of appeals placed the burden squarely on Richards
to present his conforming fee allocation. Richards has yet to meet that burden. Second, the
claim ignores years of challenges to Richards' "allocation" before the trial court (R. 49675000; 5066-94), ignores his attorneys' own affirmative admissions of non-compliance (see,
e.g., p. 4 herein) and ignores George Naegle's testimony which affirmatively established the
decline of "block billing" at a time Richards' attorneys continued to embrace it (see p. 6.
herein). Curiously, other points in Richards' own brief discuss Brown's "challenges" to
Richards' allocation. See, e.g.. Richards' Reply/Response Brief at 5-6 n.2.
2

for which there may have been an entitlement to attorney fees." Second, Brown is arguing,
both in his initial brief and here, that because Richards refused to provide evidence and make
the allocations mandated by this Court, he failed to meet the burden imposed by this Court.
Therefore, Richards should not receive any award of fees because he did not follow
the mandate of the court. An award of fees to Richards should not be based on sympathy
or a comparison to Brown's fees, which the trial court did. (R. 5877-78) The trial court was
apparently swayed by the facts that Richards' attorneys did a lot of work and Brown received
some attorney fees. Neither of these reasons falls within this Court's criteria. Richards' fee
request must be measured against the three criteria mandated. Using this measurement,
Richards' fee request fails completely. Richards' ill-disguised attempt to transform a myriad
of non-compensable fees into compensable fees on the back of the single compensable claim
illustrates the need for this Court to enforce its original position.
In his reply, Richards claims: (1) he allocated his fees (Richards' Point IA), (2) he is
entitled to fees for the "fraud defense" and because of overlap in the evidence (Richards'
Points IB and IC), and (3) that Brown conceded that the trial court's findings were
inadequate (Richards' Point IIC). Those erroneous claims will be addressed in order.
A.

Richards did not allocate attorney fees as directed by this Court.
Richards boldly asserts that he complied with this Court's remand order requiring

allocation of his attorney fees. The facts simply do not support this claim. Richards can
point to no place in the record where he made the allocations required by this Court.
Brown does not dispute the claim that Richards subdivided his attorney fees into
fourteen categories. Nor does Brown dispute the fact that Richards made some minor
3

reductions in his fee request, based on arbitrary percentages. However, this Court did not
require Richards to subdivide his fee request into fourteen parts; this Court required Richards'
fee request be divided into three simple parts. None of the fourteen categories in Richards'
fee request is labeled "successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney
fees." None of the categories is labeled "unsuccessful claims for which there would have
been an entidement to attorney fees had this claim been successful." None of the categories
is labeled "claims for which there is no entitlement to attorney fees." Richards' fourteen
categories are camouflage to hide the fact that he cannot allocate his fees as required.5 It is
significant that Richards1 response avoids any rejoinder to the recital of fatal admissions by
his attorneys, e.g. that they did not allocate fees to unsuccessful claims (R. 6050, p. 240), or
to an unsuccessful contract defense (R. 6050, p. 236), yet sought fees for unsuccessful
rescission claims (R. 5225). See, generally, Brown's first Brief, pp. 5-6 and 14-16.

^ h e fourteen categories into which Richards divides his fee request are:
1. Factual development and discovery scheduling
2. Preparation of answer and counterclaim
3. Plaintiffs' discovery
4. Defendants' discovery
5. Plaintiffs' pretrial motions
6. Damages
7. Defendants' pretrial motions
8. Jury instructions and special interrogatories
9. General trial preparation
10. Preparation of judgment and related issues
11. Post-judgment motions
12. Petition for writ of mandamus
13. Negotiation for sale of Interwest and other
14. Attorney fees
Addendum of Richards' response brief, R. 5117-5156.

4

Richards5 failure to allocate his fees into the three required categories was plain to the
trial court. The trial court found Richards1 "proofs presented at the remand hearing were
admittedly not in conformity with the remand instructions . . .." (R. 5707) The court also
found:
3.
Defendants' counsel did not allocate time based on individual claims
because of the impracticality of doing so. It would be difficult if not
impossible in many instances to know how efforts made might relate to one
claim or another. There was an overlapping of the warranty evidence and the
fraud evidence such that one could not allocate the time expended to one
claim or the other with any degree of precision. The entries in the billing of
defendants' counsel are like those of counsel for plaintiffs, quite general and
vague.
(R. 5878)
The trial court's findings substantiate Brown's assertion that the evidence presented
by Richards did not meet the requirements imposed by this Court.6 The trial court attempted
to excuse Richards' failure by parroting the claim that overlapping evidence between the noncompensable fraud claim and the compensable breach of warranty claim somehow prevented
the type of accounting which this Court mandated. However, neither the facts nor the law
support that notion.
The facts of this case, as given by Richards* own lead counsel, dispel the notion that
an inadequate allocation should be excused. Richards' attorneys admitted they knew from
the outset that Richards' case involved both contract and tort claims and that the attorney
fees for tort claims were non-compensable. (R. 6049 at 22-23)

6

Additionally, Richards'

Yet Richards mistakenly characterizes Brown's argument as "frivolous and even
sanctionable." Richards' Reply/Response Brief at 5.

5

attorneys knew the law concerning attorney fees. As noted in Brown's first brief, they knew
the standards for award of attorney fees in Utah (R. 6049 at 19-20), and they knew that no
recovery of attorney fees was available for tort claims. (R. 6049 at 106) Despite their
knowledge of the facts and the law, Richards' attorneys never kept track of time by specific
claim (R. 6049 at 40) and those working on the case never even discussed whether time
recorded on their time sheets should be allocated between the compensable breach claim and
the non-compensable fraud claim. (R. 6049 at 87) Thus, the evidence shows that the
attorneys purposely followed a course of conduct which prevented an adequate accounting
of their fees, contrary to Utah law.
The trial court found that Richards' attorneys engaged in "block billing," a practice
where all of the time spent in any one day on a client's case is billed as one block of time
and no separate allocation is made among individual claims, whether they are compensable
or not. (R. 5709) However, these same attorneys also represented insurance companies, which
were prohibiting "block billing." (R. 6049, p. 73-74; R. 6050, p. 281-287) The underlying time
sheets, never made available to the trial court, also made no allocation among the variety of
claims which Richards pursued. Therefore, Richards' attorneys could not separate work on
the compensable breach claim from the non-compensable fraud and misrepresentation claims,
which the trial court found formed the bulk of Richards' case.

(R. 5553, p.6-7)

Richards' attorneys claimed adherence to the time keeping required to make the
allocations would have been "impractical." However, such time keeping would not have been
difficult. Richards' lead attorney acknowledged to the jury that "the warranty doesn't turn
or depend upon the motive or intention or even good faith, of the representation." (R. 4226,
6

p. 5081) This difference could easily have served as the bright line for time keeping by the
attorneys. Any time that involved Brown's motive, intent or good faith could have been
recorded separately. That this easily-understood distinction in time keeping was ignored
underscores the attorneys' stated intent to claim all fees, regardless of any award for breach
of warranty (R. 5227-8).
Due to Richards' attorneys' conscious disregard of the law, and in light of the facts
and findings of the trial court which demonstrate that the evidence supporting Richards' fee
application did not satisfy the requirements imposed by this Court, Richards should have
been awarded no attorney fees.
B. Richards is not entided to fees other than those incurred for the breach of warranty
claim, but only if proof of those fees satisfied this Court's requirements.
In his response Richards continues to raise the argument which he made in the trial
court-that he his entitled to attorney fees because of the overlap in proof between the noncompensable fraud claim and the compensable breach of warranty claim. This argument
takes two, slightly different forms. First, Richards claims that he is entitled to fees for his
"fraud defense" to Brown's claims. (Richards' Reply/Response Brief, Point IB at 6-7)
Second, Richards claims that he is entitled to fees for fraud because of the overlap between
the fraud and breach of warranty claims. ( Id-, at 8-10) Both of these variations of the
argument are contrary to the facts and the law.
With respect to the so-called "fraud defense," Richards incredibly states:
This Court clearly held in Brown L 840 P.2d at 150, that Richards relied on
the 'fraud defense' as part of the 'substantial performance defense' in prevailing
against Brown's Interwest contract claim. Accordingly, Richards was entitled
to fees for proving his fraud defense. Brown L 840 P.2d at 150, 154.
7

(Jd., at 6-7) Richards makes it sound as if this Court ruled that he was entitled to attorney
fees for the "fraud defense." But this Court made no such ruling. An examination of the
pages cited by Richards reveals that the court mentioned Richards' "fraud defense," but
never held that Richards was entitled to fees for it.
Richards also makes the startling argument that Brown is foreclosed from raising the
issue of Richards' entidement to fees for the "fraud defense" on this appeal. (Id., at 7) In
support of this unusual claim, Richards cites several portions of the record and concludes
that Brown did not object at trial and therefore, should be precluded from raising the issue
on appeal.

In fact, the portions of the record cited by Richards all concern his "fraud

defense" not the award of attorney fees for the "fraud defense." This appeal is not about
the validity of the "fraud defense" but rather the invalidity of an award of unallocated and
unproven attorney fees for the "fraud defense."
The way in which Richards presented his case to the jury also reveals that the
"overlapping issues" argument is now advanced by Richards solely as a method to obtain
fees for the fraud claim. Richards* initial counterclaim sought tort recovery, as did each
subsequent amendment. Richards' case was filled with tort issues and evidence. Almost
every witness called by Richards or cross-examined by Richards was asked tort-related
questions. As the trial court found,
The theme of Richards1 case was fraud. Defendant's counsel carried that claim
to the jury by clear and convincing evidence by far the greater quantity of
evidence and the greater number of witnesses supported negligent
misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty. The result of the expenditure
of time, efforts and expenses are clearly mirrored in the juryfs verdict.

8

(R. 5879). In his claim for fees, Richards failed to delineate the elements of the breach of
warranty claim and the distinct elements of the fraud and misrepresentation claims. "Unlike
liability for negligence, which is based on fault, breach of warranty sounds in strict liability."
Groen v. Tri-O-Inc. 667 P.2d 598, 604 (Utah 1983). On remand, Richards should have, but
did not, factor into his fee request which portion of his trial evidence would not have been
admitted but for the claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation.
Because Richards was unable to meet his burden of separating his warranty-related
fees from fees for his other claims, the trial court was required to examine Richards*
counterclaim to determine what proof he was able to present that would not have been
admitted on the breach of warranty claim alone. Because Richards failed to allocate fees, the
trial court was required to quantify which of the tort and non-asset contract evidence was not
linked to a specific decrease in value in order to qualify for benefit of the bargain damages.
Richards argues that the factual issues of warranty and fraud overlap and that he is entitled
to recover fees under the contract for the commonality of some facts, ignoring the separate
elements of each and the separate burdens of proof. However, in answering the special
interrogatories, the jury found that benefit of the bargain damages, even though available,
were not appropriate for the warranty claims. (R. 2820)

Simply put, Richards may not

recover contract fees for a simple contract issue following a successful fraud case unless the
fees requested are separately identified and appropriate to only the simple contract issue.
Because most of Richards' trial evidence was not tied to any sort of damages, that
evidence had absolutely nothing to do with the contractual claims and all the fees incurred
in developing and presenting it should have been excluded by Richards from the fee
9

calculation. Richards' claim concerning overlap of the fraud and breach of warranty claims
ignores the fact that it was he who refused to allocate attorney time spent on compensable
claims, non-compensable claims, and unsuccessful claims. Had this required allocation been
made the trial court's conclusion would have been far more accurate and reviewable as
mandated by this Court. However, because Richards failed to make the allocations, the trial
court should not have attempted its own allocations by relying on whatever categorization
Richards chose to provide. Rather, the trial court should have followed this Court's mandate
and disallowed all of Richards' attorney fees because of the insufficiency of the allocations.
C. Richards misconstrues Brown's claim of error by the trial court.
In Point IIC of his response brief, Richards argues that Brown concedes the
inadequacy of the trial court's findings on fees. (Richards' Reply/Response Brief at 13-15)
This argument misperceives Brown's position. On the cross-appeal, Brown argued that the
trial court abused its discretion in awarding any attorney fees to Richards, while in response
to the issue raised by Richards, Brown asserted that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in the amount of attorney fees awarded to Richards. These positions are not inconsistent.
In fact, the argument raised by Brown concerning the adequacy of Richards' evidence is a
threshold to the argument made by Richards.

If Brown's position is accepted, any

consideration of the fees claimed by Richards is precluded.
Brown's position on this point is based on this Court's statement in Redevelopment
Agency v. Daskalas. 785 P.2d 1112, 1126 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). There, the court stated, "an
award [of attorney fees] made without adequate supporting evidence constitutes an abuse of
discretion and must be overruled." Brown maintains the trial court abused its discretion
10
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Valley Dairy Ass'n.. 657 P.2d 1279, 1288 (Utah 1982). A trial court that awards attorney fees
based on inadequate evidence abuses its discretion, Redevelopment Agency. 785 P.2d at
1
This Court noted in Brown that this was a complex matter involving the adjudication
of multiple claims arising under several contracts with each party winning on some issues and
losing on some issues
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Richards argues that Brown has conceded the insufficiency of the trial court's findings.
Brown does n o t concede that the trial court ^ findings are insufficient. Rather, Brown asserts

that the trial court should have simply stopped when it found that Richards' "proofs
presented at the remand hearing were admittedly not in conformity with the remand
instructions . . .." (R.5707) At that point the trial court should not have attempted an
allocation but should have simply concluded that the nonconformity prevented Richards from
recovering any attorney fees despite his entidement. However, except for this initial error
by the trial court, Brown contends that the trial court's subsequent findings were sufficient.
In support of his erroneous assertion, Richards cites

Selvage v. J J. Johnson &

Assocs.. 910 P.2d 1252 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), in an effort to demonstrate the alleged
insufficiency of the trial court's findings. Richards' Reply/Response Brief at 13-14. Richards
fails to disclose that Selvage really supports Brown's position. In Selvage, a creditor brought
claims against a transferee under both multiple contracts and the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act (UFTA). Id, at 1256. The creditor prevailed under both the contract and
UFTA theories and his attorney submitted an affidavit in support of an application for
attorney fees.

The attorney did not allocate his fees into the three

categories but rather simply attached billing records to the affidavit.

Cottonwood Mall
Id, The trial court

awarded attorney fees under provisions in the contracts but reduced the amount from the
requested $175,000 to $42,500. I d at 1257. Most importandy, the trial court's findings on
the fee issue identified only four factors which were considered in the award of the creditor's
fees. I d Only the creditor appealed the attorney fee issue.
This Court's holding in Selvage has particular application in this case. The court
there held that the issue of attorney fees should be remanded for entry of more findings
which would support the amount of the original award. LdL at 1266. However, before
12
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In his response brief, Richards cites very few cases in support of his claim that his
allocation was satisfactory , albeit non c snforming.

L

kkl itiona] 1') R ichards refuses to d isci iss

the leading Utah cases on the issue of attorney fees. Those cases support Brown's position
that Richards' failure to allocate fees precluded any award of fees.
Even the most recent case from tl le Utah Supreme < • .ir*. suppor- n* A\?

; ••-,-•

In Foote v. Clark. 962 P.2d 52 (Utah 1998), the court reviewed an award of attorney fees
arising from the breach of a real estate sales contract,

The trial court ordered that the

defendants pay the full amount of the plaintiffs' attorney fees. Id. at
c .

u,.

-

:' •"• "- «iffu< ••

<—r- -

t : io\vc\c:, :K ^ria,

.'V: tr. .J

:< 'indin^s of fact

regarding the particular fees billed or the quality of the work done. IcL The Utah Supreme
Court, after noting that when the evidence of fees presented is insufficient, an award oi fees

cannot stand, stated that the attorney's affidavit "did not, as it should have, categorized the
fee request according to the plaintiffs' successful and unsuccessful claims and the opposing
parties involved in the action." I d at 55. The court also stated that because the fees for
services related to tort as well as contract claims, "even a cursory look at counsel's affidavit
reveals counsel's failure to properly categorize the fee request and raises questions about the
reasonableness of the fees related to the breach of contract claim." Id, Finally, the court
stated that a plaintiff '"should not have a free ride to assert claims against other defendants
with the expectation that the target defendant will end up paying all of the attorney's fees,'
even when those claims factually relate to claims for which the plaintiff may be entitled to
attorney fees." I d at 56, quoting Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management. Inc.. 645
P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982).
Here, as in Foote. Richards* fraud claim should not be permitted a "free ride" on the
back of his breach claim. Richards' failure to allocate typifies the evidence which the court
in Foote held was insufficient to support an award of attorney fees. The court stated that
when a party's "evidentiary submissions in support of a request for attorney fees are
deficient, so will be the court's evaluation of those fees." Foote. 962 P.2d at 56. Because
Richards' submissions were insufficient, the trial court's own allocation of his fees should not
have occurred. However, as opposed to Foote. this Court should not remand to provide
Richards with a third opportunity to make the allocations which this Court mandated,
particularly where the billing records make such allocation impossible. The trial court erred
when it awarded Richards any attorney fees.
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RICHARDS SHOULD NOT HAVE RECEIVED ATTORNEY
FEES FOR CALCULATING HIS ATTORNEY FEES.
In his opening L-riLi . . :11c cro;-- ^ppe ;., oi AM* r ^ ^

,

-

-• ;

M- -•

have awarded Richards fees for calculating his attorney fees. (Point II, pp. io-LJ }

Brown

maintains that such an award rewards Richards' recalcitrance, especially in light :>f the fact
that ..a^ Richards allocated :*^ : ^ • .*. :ie snowa na\c, nu substantial fees :?k.u:n\. ;'•
E ichards in the calci llation process w 01 lid have been unnecessary, and that the calculation
process was little more than an exercise in futility since Richards did not and cannot make
the required allocations. In response, Richards embraces Salmon v. Davis County,

_!a

C t App. 1994), without discussing them in any serious fashion. Close examination of these
cases reveals that they do not support Richards' position.

some mention here. The reasoning which supported an award of fees for the calculation of
fees in Salmon did not command a majority of the Utah Supreme Court. See Salmon. 916
P.,_u a

n Salmon. Justice Durham (joined b) Justice Ste s art) conch iided that the stati ite

in question must be broadly construed to allow an award of attorney fees necessarily incurred
in litigating to recover fees initially provided by the statute, to prevent rendering such a fee

shifting statute impotent.
Durhan < . :• -.

!'.-..

i

.mi. ^

a -..:•..

perspective and pointed out a significant dissimilarity between the

case and the "normal contract case." Chief Justice Zimmerman stated:
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Justice Durham analogi2ed Salmon's case to typical cases where attorney
fees incurred on appeal are awarded whenever attorney fees were initially
authorized by statute or contract. . . .
However, Salmon could not raise the attorney fee issue in the
underlying proceedings [in this case] because the County [from which he
sought attorney fees] was not a party to the underlying criminal actions against
him. This anomaly sets §63-30a-2 apart from the vast majority of our cases
which rely on a statutory or contractual provision for attorney fees, where the
attorney fee issue can be litigated in the same proceeding as the substantive
right to which this award of fees is attached.
916 P.2d at 901-02. Justice Zimmerman's reasoning is crucial to an understanding of that
case and distinguishes Salmon from this case.
In Salmon, the party from which fees were sought, Davis County, was not a party to
the underlying litigation which generated the need for fees. And the county exacerbated the
attorney fees incurred by Salmon when it refused to submit the dispute to arbitration,
disputed the amount which he claimed, and finally recommended that Salmon file a
complaint to obtain a judicial ruling on the reasonable fees sought in order to disgorge fees
from the county. In other words, the county "ran up the bill." 916 P.2d at 892. This alone
distinguishes the present case from Salmon. Here, it was Richards' failure to allocate fees
among compensable claims and non-compensable claims which forced the court of appeals
to vacate the original award of attorney fees to Richards and remand the case for an
appropriate award of attorney fees taking those three categories into account. The allocation
then attempted by Richards consumed hundreds of hours1 time, for which Richards
subsequendy sought, and obtained, partial compensation. By his attorneys' failure to record
and allocate time properly, it was Richards who "ran up the bill." Brown, unlike the county
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-ver how much subsequent fees were incurred to calculate fees.

Brown should not have to pay Richards' fees for attempting to calculate fees.
('hief justice Zimmerman also addressed the concern of exorbitant fee requests and
ttrdlt

Hru'wT..;,

w • v in Niiinon

let here, Richards' attorneys, who were

experienced in complex litigation cases and also seemingly knew they had to allocate their
time, failed to keep their time records in a fashion that would generate far less effort to

an attempt to direct attention from, the obvious - failure to make the required allocations.
Salmon does not address this situation where experienced attorneys utterly fail to
r<r<<<

KJ\

••

•- .

..

.;-

- .*

•

*'/rvnsable litigation issi ics.

Therefore, the Salmon fee-for-fee opinion does not assist Richards' claim and should not be
read as offering rewards to attorneys who fail to present evidence in support of fee requests.
iames Constructors ai- • ,i<*- -u •. pp..; t i ..Juul,. 1 n l.i in

Spt uiu ally, Ru hauls Luis

to note that recovery of attorney fees in ' ames Constructors was permitted under a contract
provision peculiar to that case. James Constructors. 888 P.2d at 668, 674. The contract
provision under which Richards claimed ice: n: *:. .a ,

ncarr a.- spcunc.

Perhaps the most convincing argument for why Richards should not receive fees for
calculating fees is found in Richards' own reply/response brief. On page 1, Richards states
"After a significant expenditure of time a.;J i.auir. :^aurd- submitted voluminous evidence
. . . ."

Wh*

• •

.:

. M

:•.

•

•

the lawyers had kept 'time records in accord w-th I :ah

*

.

—

.<

,

. n

;-. \^.\ taring to 1977, the

"significant expenditure of time and funds" uouiu haw i-a'n unnecessary.
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Stubbs v.

Hemmert. 567 P.2d 168, 171 (Utah 1977); See also Trayner v. Cushing. 688 P.2d 856, 858
(Utah 1984). Brown should not be required to pay for the admitted refusal of Richards'
attorneys to follow the law which they said they knew. The trial court should not have
awarded Richards fees for the expensive, unnecessary and unresponsive process by which he
calculated his fees.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE AWARDED
PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST TO RICHARDS ON ATTORNEY FEES.
On the cross-appeal, Brown argued that Richards should not have been awarded
interest on the award of attorney fees.7 Both sides agree that resolution of this issue depends
on the proper application of Mason v. Western Mortgage Loan Corp.. 754 P.2d 984 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988) and Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet. 876 P.2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), to
Richards' fee judgment in this case, which was vacated because the trial court's findings were
inadequate. The entire amount of Richards' fees were before the trial court on remand,
dependant upon his supporting evidence. This Court's prior decision to vacate Richards' fee
award constitutes a complete abandonment of that award. Brown's first brief points out that
since the award was vacated, not modified, any fees awarded to Richards must bear interest
"from the date of entry of such new judgment." Mason. 754 P.2d at 986, quoting Stockton

7

As noted in Brown's brief, confusion exists concerning whether the interest awarded
was pre-judgment or post-judgment interest. Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 24 n.
5. Brown argued that neither pre-or post-judgment interest was appropriate. I d at 23-27.
Richards responds only on post-judgment interest, apparently conceding that any award of
pre-judgment interest would be reversible error.
18
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Allen. 876 P.2d at 427.
Bailey-Allen a n d M a s o n stand for the proposition that in any case which the appellate
c 3i i i:t re t:i lands t :> th * trial :• :)i :i it: I: ji ldgment interest dates : t ll \ fron I tl: le ei itnr of the neu
judgment.

While M a s o n cited a general rule from a California case, Stockton, which

emphasized the distinction between a modification and a reversal, Mason's holding involved
a

M L ; * .-

: .:

• :,;::-

.:
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;
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,

the original judgment. Stockton's discussion of its rule for modifications can be described
as merely dicta.
af t u r t l e s

l e i ' h iu

360 P.2d at nC 'Ca 1 1°M N Because this Court vacated the award of
KUIMJJN

niitl
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Brown. 840 P.2d at 156, the amount of the award was unascertainable until a new sum was
entered in the trial court. Bailey-Allen seems to require that judgment interest be entered
from the date of the new judgment whenever the trial IOUJM must lake evidence t<» teat It a
decision following remand. 876 P.2d at 426.
If this Court finds it necessary to classify its prior decision as a reversal or a
modification, it s h o u . j IOUK ;O other jurisdictions to determine whether to take a moK :t .«r:iiaapproach or \;i hether t :» exam ine the nati ire and the effect of the decision. For example, in
Miller v. TransFlorida Bank. 656 So.2d 1 >64, 1366-67 (Fla. Dist App. l r '05), the court held
that post-judgment interest on attorney r c o oiiould not accrue from the Uare or the original
tJL<

• • • • • • • :
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. • \
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.-fx.-J
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attorney fees because the trial court h a d used a contingency risk multiplier in computing the
a m o u n t of fees and remanded t o the trial court to consider the reasonableness ui hours

claimed by the attorney. IdL at 1365. In reaching its subsequent decision the court relied
heavily on the language of the appellate court which stated "The judgment as to attorney fees
is reversed" rather than analyzing the effect of the decision which was only to reduce the
award. I d at 1366.
Similarly, the trend in this jurisdiction, as set by Bailey-Allen, is that any reversal such
as in this case which could result in no fees at all being awarded is an abandonment of the
initial judgment, which means that any interest on a subsequent judgment should run only
from the date of that judgment, not the date of the original judgment.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT DETERMINED
THAT POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST CARRIES THE INTEREST RATE
OF THE OLD STATUTE RATHER THAN THE NEW STATUTE.
On the cross-appeal Brown argued that the trial applied the wrong interest rate to the
judgments. The trial court should have applied the interest rate statute as modified by the
legislature during the pendency of the proceedings rather than the old interest rate statute in
effect at the time the case started. Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 27-29. Richards
responds by relying on his interpretation of the federal statute in Kaiser Aluminum v.
Bonjorno. 494 U.S. 827 (1990).
As Brown pointed out in his initial brief (p.27-29), the Utah statute differs in a
significant way from the federal statute interpreted in Kaiser Aluminum. Richards does not
address these differences.

Kaiser Aluminum was based on a 1982 change in the federal

judgment interest statute, 28 USC §1961, which provided that the interest rate is calculated
from the date of entry of the judgment. However, the Utah statute does not refer to the
20
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statutes is critical and distinguishes this case from Kaiser Aluminum.
By omitting reference to date u; cntr\. IIK • ..... legislature intended judgments bear
thi -MI

'
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• ' [ . c ff. --^v J . >

"amendment and,

as provided in the statute, on the first of each year, Utah Code Ann., §15-1-4(2).
Richards also relies on i tan K ,-^dc Ann., §(nS > j , whi^n provides that no part of the
"revised stufuH'i." is 'vinui, tiw unless ^c-Nprcs^ l\

dtrlarul

This provision ,\« M »II I I'nr

application if Brown were asking the court to apply the new statute retroactively. However,
even a cursory examination of Brown's brief discloses that Brown is merely asking that the
statx ite be gi , c 1:1 effe ct as : f effecti x e date th z interest rate changii ig sach } • : ar. 11: 1 : t
retroactively, in Ucz, the Utah Supreme Court has indicated that statutes should be given
effect immediately. In Madsen v. BorthicL 769 P.2d 245, 252 n, 11 1T< h 1988), the Utah
Supreme Court stated that ordinarily, ~ -. J presumption [is] that an aiiie ndmei it is intended
to change existing legal rights." See also Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre Inv. Co. 956 P.2d 257,
261 (Utah 1998); Visitor Info. Ctr. v. Tax Comm?n.. 930 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Utah 1997), In
other words, the change in the interest rate statute sn-uk; ....,^ been applied fa) tl le trial
c '.:•

. ffi•,::-.! d r

f the amendment to effectuate the legislature's purpose to

change existing legal rights. The trial court should have awarded interest on the non-contract
awards at \1 *- trom the December .... V)v: judgment through Ma\ ... 1
ii u-u *"

*

;
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f -

ti)i]

'

9.22% for 1995, then 7.35% from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 1996, then 7.45°/0 from
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January 1, 1997 to the date of judgment, when the offset in Brown's favor would accrue
contract interest.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AWARDING PRE-JUDGMENT
INTEREST ON THE BREACH OF WARRANTY DAMAGES.
In his first brief Brown maintained that the trial court committed reversible error
when it awarded pre-judgment interest on the breach of warranty damages. Those damages
were not calculable with mathematical certainty until they were determined by the jury.
Brown also argued that Richards was not entitled to pre-judgment interest because it was not
awarded in the October 1990 judgment and he did not appeal the issue.
Richards' response demonstrates the validity of Brown's position. First, Richards
claims that damages were precisely ascertainable.

However, he admits "the jury was

instructed to award damages based on comparison of the value of the assets as received and
as warranted" and that ". . .there was a factual dispute about those values . . .." Richards'
Reply/Response Brief at 22-23. Richards thus concedes that the damages could not be fixed
until the jury determined the values. Therefore, warranty damages plainly were not calculable
with any degree of certainty, much less the mathematical precision required by the case law,
until the jury fixed the values. See, e ^ , Bellon v. Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089, 1097 (Utah 1991).
Therefore, pre-judgment interest should not have been awarded.
Richards next claims that he could not appeal the trial court's initial decision to deny
pre-judgment interest because the trial court denied him any damages for breach of warranty.
Richards' Reply/Response Brief at 23. What Richards does not explain is how the court's
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ruling on damages foreclosed him from appealing the interest issue. Richards points to no
case which permits a party to preserve an issue for appeal which has been previously waived.
In fact, permitting such a rule would establish a dangerous precedent because cases would
never reach a resolution, they would instead undergo round after round of endless appeals.
Finally, Richards asks this Court to bypass the established case law on pre-judgment
interest and the facts of this case and give him prejudgment interest to prevent "a rapacious
result." Brown can hardly be characteri2ed as a greedy plunderer for pointing out the trial
court's error and Richards' acquiescence. This Court should decline Richards' invitation to
ignore the law and the facts because he has given this Court neither a legal or factual basis
for such action.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE OFFSET THE JUDGMENT
SO THAT ONLY O N E NET JUDGMENT RESULTED.
Brown argued that the trial court should have combined the various judgments in this
case into one net award with one interest rate. In response, Richards argues that Brown did
not preserve this error for appeal.
Before the trial court first ruled on fees after remand, Brown reminded the trial court
of the interest differential that continued to grow in Richards1 favor until a judgment was
entered, thus preserving this issue. (R. 5542) When the court first ruled, it instructed Brown's
attorneys to factor all the rulings into the "former judgment," uncertain as to who would owe
who. (R. 5554)

That October, 1990 judgment contained no offset provision with one

resulting interest rate, rather the award for each claim, with its attendant interest, stands on
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its own. (R.4072-4102) Thus the result of the interest awards in the current judgment is the
same as the original judgment, as the trial court directed.
Richards also argues that Brown may not object to a judgment which he prepared and
that the variety of interest rates prevented this judgment from being unified into a single
judgment with one interest rate. Richards' argument ignores the fact that Brown was again
directed by the trial court to reduce its minute entry into judgment form.

(R. 5712)

Obviously, the trial court had decided this issue at this point and would hear nothing further
on it. With respect to the multiplicity of interest rates, nothing prevented the trial court from
entering one net judgment, which in fact it did. (R. 5883) But the trial court failed to award
interest on that net result at one interest rate. This seemed to be the direction of the Utah
Supreme Court in Hansen v. Kohler. 550 P.2d 186, 198 (Utah 1976) and should be the
direction of this Court.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this brief and Brown's opening brief on the cross-appeal,
Brown requests that this Court: (1) vacate the award of attorney fees to Richards, (2) vacate
the award of attorney fees for calculating fees, (3) vacate the award of interest on the
attorney fees, (4) reverse the trial court's judgment that interest carry the applicable rate of
interest in effect at the time of the judgment, (5) vacate the award of pre-judgment interest
on the breach of warranty claim, (6) reverse the trial court's decision that the judgments
should not offset, with multiple interest notes, and (7) award Brown attorney fees for this
appeal. Brown requests that the case be remanded for entry of appropriate orders.
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On the issues raised by Richards, Brown requests that this Court: (1) if it rules against
the first issue raised by Brown, affirm the trial court's ruling on the amount of attorney fees
awarded to Richards, (2) deny Richards any fees for this appeal, (3) affirm the trial court's
award of costs to Richards, and (4) affirm the trial court's award of attorney fees to Brown
on the rescission claim.
DATED this 2nd day of December, 1998.
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and Cross-Appellants
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